Sabah Sarawak Union - United Kingdom

On July 9, 1963, the governments of the Federation of Malaya, the United Kingdom, Sarawak, North Borneo and Singapore signed the Malaysia Agreement that brought Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak into the federation.

The federal parliament then passed the Malaysia Act to amend the federal constitution to include the three new states and to provide for matters in connection with the admission.

On Sept 10 , six days before Malaysia was to be declared, the government of Kelantan began an action against the federal government for declarations that the Malaysia Agreement and the Malaysia Act were null and void or were not binding on the state.

In the case of The Government of the State of Kelantan v The Government of the Federation of Malaya and Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj ("the Kelantan case"), Kelantan argued that:

Chief justice James Thomson delivered his decision 30 hours before Malaysia was to be declared, saying: "Never, I think, has a judge had to pronounce on an issue of such magnitude on so little notice and with so little time for consideration."

He added that "a clearer expression of opinion than would be customary is clearly required in a matter which relates to the interests of political stability in this part of Asia and the interests of 10 million people, about half a million of them being inhabitants of the state of Kelantan".

Thomson responded to the five different arguments forwarded by the Kelantan government by framing the issues into one general question of "whether parliament or the executive government has trespassed in any way the limits placed on their powers by the constitution".

In this way, he bypassed addressing some fundamental questions relating to the supremacy of the constitution raised by the Kelantan government. Nevertheless, he still managed to make several important constitutional pronouncements. The court said that;

• even if Kelantan was a sovereign state prior to the 1957 Federation of Malaya Agreement, the effect of that agreement was that a large proportion of the powers that make up sovereignty passed from the Kelantan government to that of the federation.
• These powers are thus limited to and subject to the 1957 Federal Constitution that formed part of the agreement. The court also found that the Malaysia Act in amending the constitution to admit the new states and changing the name to "Malaysia" did not contravene the requirements of the constitution, which were found to be liberal in such matters.
• And if the steps that had been taken were in all respects lawful, the nature of the results they had produced could not make them unlawful.
• What is now known as the "basic structure doctrine" stipulates that a constitutional amendment can be declared by the courts to be invalid on the grounds that it destroys the basic structure of the constitution.
• The courts, therefore, must play a vital role in ensuring that the basic structure is not dismantled. It is within their function to interpret the constitution and determine what the basic features are.

With respect, the court in the Kelantan case missed the opportunity to make a pronouncement on this. There was certainly merit in the argument that theinclusion of the three new states with their different status and privileges as compared with the original 11 states created a fundamental change to the structure of the federation, at least in the eyes of Kelantan and the 10 other original members.

The Kelantan case, besides being a political challenge to the fundamental principle of equality found in the 1957 agreement, manifested into a legal pronouncement of the state of constitutionalism in the new federation.

Although subsequent judicial decisions in Malaysia did not show approval for this doctrine, they did not completely close the door that was opened by the Kelantan case. The future of constitutionalism and the supremacy of the constitution rest significantly on the continuous deliberation of the basic structure doctrine by our courts.

The Kelantan challenge was thus a significant chapter in Malaysian constitutional history. It resulted in establishing the constitutional relations between the component states of the federation, defining the path along which federalism in Malaysia will go.

In particular, this episode appears to have been a precursor of things to come for the constitutional and political relations between Kelantan and the federal government.

Source: Johan S. Sabaruddin, senior lecturer at the University of Malaya’s Faculty of Law.

Although much publicity was given to the status that Sabah would enjoy in the proposed Federation and the range of safeguards that would be granted to the State, the interference of the Federal government in State affairs actually commenced within months of the birth of the Malaysia nation. The saga began with the tussle for control of the State government between Tun Fuad and Tun Mustapha, the outcome of which was dictated by Kuala Lumpur. Paul Raffaele in his book Harris Salleh of Sabah gives an accurate assessment of the event:

“… Although the early leaders of Sabah had hoped that Malaysia would be a true Federation and not a unitary state, post-independence history has shown that when the interests of Sabah and Kuala Lumpur clash, the Federal government will step in unhesistantly and bring its younger partner to heel. Tunku Abdul Rahman saw the Kadazan Chief Minister as less than totally committed to Malaysia, unlike his friend Mustapha who saw the new Federation as giving power support to his claim of Malay and Muslim political primacy in Sabah” (Raffaele, 1986, p.30)

The details of the events surrounding the Mustapha-Fuad crisis are well documented in history books. Suffice it to say that the difference between the two leaders lie in the fact that while Tun Fuad Stephens was jealously guarding the State’s rights in pursuance of the original safeguards and promises, Tun Mustapha was more interested in strengthening Islam and developing Malay dominance in Sabah, regardless of its effects on state affairs. Numerous clashes between the two leaders can be traced to these fundamental differences in outlook and orientation. For instance, Tun Mustapha refused to approve the appointment of John Dusing as State Secretary, in contravention of the behaviour of a constitutional Head of State. However, all this was done with the help of the Federal Secretary in the person of Mr. Yeap Kee Aik whose major role was to strengthen Kuala Lumpur’s hold on the frontier State, by ensuring that “any party favouring Malaysia should prosper while being unfavourably disposed to any party that seem to have doubts about the Federation” (Raffaele, 1986,pp. 142-144)

This has led some scholars to describe the 20 Points safeguard as follows:

“The intent of the safeguards was to give State leaders the illusion of having greater control than they in fact possessed, but illusions which they were to take very seriously.” (Ross-Larson, 1980).

The Mustapha-Stephens crisis can be aptly described as follows:

“The two (referring to Tun Mustapha and Tun Fuad Stephens) were unwitting actors in a drama written by the Federal government, and both felt compelled to play out their roles, however reluctantly.” (Ross-Larson, 1980)

The hands of the Federal government in shaping the political development and accelerating the erosion of State’s constitutional safeguards, can be clearly seen in the selection, encouragement and support for a state leader who reflected the Federal cause, who in the immediate years after Independence was none other than Tun Mustapha. In order to further ensure that the new State government would not be too independent-minded and thereby jeopardise federal’s interests in the State, Syed Kechik, a strong UMNO supporter and the political secretary to the Minister of Information, was assigned to assist Tun Mustapha. Syed Kechik’s contributions included the introduction of various constitutional amendments and new laws to shift the power from the State to the Federal government. It is believed that he was also instrumental in the resignation of top civil servants who were thought to be pro-state and their replacement by Federal sympathizers.

Whenever the question of who should bear the responsibilities for the erosion of the constitutional safeguards is raised, the standard answer is that it was the doings of the Sabah leaders themselves. However, history has shown that during the USNO’s rule the erosion of constitutional safeguards on education, language and religion can be directly traced to machinations of Kuala Lumpur’s appointees including Syed Kechik, the then Attorney General of Sabah and other Federal officers who were unsympathetic and unmindful of their far-reaching consequences on the State.

For the sake of harmonious and enduring Federal-State relationship in the future, the Federal government has as much obligation as the State government in upholding the constitutional safeguards.

In instances where erosion of constitutional safeguards has occurred either unwittingly or erroneously, the parties involved should take steps to restore such rights, otherwise inaction would be interpreted as a deliberate scheme to weaken the power of the other party.

In the final years before the rise of BERJAYA in 1976, Tun Mustapha began to lose favour with the Federal government. This was primarily because of the misuse of his draconian powers, bestowed on him originally by the Federal government, which eventually made him a political liability to Kuala Lumpur. His plan to break away from the Federation by proposing the formation of Borneosia and establish his sultanate was also an important factor which contributed to his fall from the grace of the Federal government. But by then, Tun Mustapha had paved the way for the erosion of the safeguards on Education, Language and Religion. Throughout his regime, the Federal government essentially abandoned the people of Sabah to his abuse of their democratic rights and his squandering of the State’s natural resources. When political intervention would have been justified, and indeed was most needed, Kuala Lumpur opted to assume a spectator’s role to the great disappointment of the people of Sabah.

The emergence of BERJAYA and the success it had in deposing the regime of Tun Mustapha occurred with the support of the Tun Razak government. In its early stage of development, the party sought earnestly to reverse the excesses of Tun Mustapha. However, when its leaders were assured of deriving support from the Federal government, it committed the same excesses as its predecessor. As with Tun Mustapha’s Administration, the Harris’ Administration became increasingly more autocratic and intolerant to well-intended public criticisms. It distanced itself from the Rakyat by pursuing policy objectives contrary to the wishes and aspirations of the people. It had even gone to the extent of changing the district status of Tambunan just to punish the voters who defied his order to support him. His abuse of power included the liberal use of Federal and State machineries in the 1985 general elections campaigns.

In the ensuing years Datuk Harris’ Government committed other political excesses similar to those of his predecessor. The problem of illegal entrants obtaining blue IC became increasingly more acute without his government doing something about the problem. Datuk Harris’ Government promoted massive conversion to Islam among indigenous Sabahans by granting favours to prospective converts. His government’s desire to keep the Federal happy culminated in the signing away of Labuan, free of charge, without the consent of the people of Sabah, although on the surface the federalisation of Labuan appeared to have been properly executed by subtly forcing an enactment through the State assembly. The act was also a breach to the Twenty Points safeguards.

When the PBS came into power, the Federal government could not accept the defeat of the party that had been so accommodating to Kuala Lumpur’s drive towards a unitary state. Amidst the events that followed the power grab at the Istana until the next general State elections in 1986, when the people of Sabah were forced to give their verdict on the legality of the government of the day, traces of Kuala Lumpur’s involvement were obvious. The fact that those involved in the power grab were let loose caused many Malaysians to take a dim view of the rule of Law as there was a clear case of miscarriage of justice. Between April 21, 1985 and May 5, 1986, two State general elections were held in close succession because of the reluctance of certain Federal leaders in endorsing the results of the 1985 general elections which saw the defeat of the Federal-anointed party. Prime Minister Datuk Seri Dr. Mahathir Mohammed when interviewed about the unsettled political climate in Sabah, was widely reported to have said that he himself was not sure as to which government, the ruling PBS Government or the contending USNO-BERJAYA coalition Government, would the Court uphold as the duly elected government of the people of Sabah.

It is amazing that the vanquished parties even had the audacity to hail the victor to court and demanded that they be installed to replace the rightfully elected government by claiming to represent the wishes of the majority of the people. While the people of Sabah were fearing for their lives, no decisive action was taken by Federal Government until the tense situation escalated into outbreak of lawlessness causing losses of property and lives. When those responsible were finally brought before the courts the charges handed out were viewed by Sabahans as a mockery vis-à-vis the extent of damages, human tragedy and economic losses caused by the rioters. Indeed, there were broad hints that some quarters were using the March 1986 riots to justify the imposition of Emergency rule in sabah by the Federal government, as a way to replace the democratically elected government.

Finally, many Sabahans consider the proposed entry of the UMNO into Sabah as not entirely unrelated to the issue of political interference. While the move has been cast in the name of championing Muslim cause and so-called bumiputera rights, the timing of the exercise and the past records of Kuala Lumpur’s interference in State affairs leave many nationalistic Malaysians of local origin unconvinced that the move will lead to any enhancement of Federal-State relations. Indeed Sabahans take the view that the whole exercise will be detrimental to national unity because the promotion of communal politics in Sabah will bring about racial and religious polarisation and split the already well-integrated people of Sabah. In the long term, communal politics go against the spirit of multiracialism which the Sabah leaders have so tirelessly championed. The proposed move of UMNO into Sabah also indicates the lack of understanding by the Federal leadership on the socio-cultural and psychological makeup of the people of Sabah. Unlike the people in Peninsular Malaysia, where people can be conveniently classified into Malays, Chinese and Indians, in Sabah, the racial and religious differences are unimportant as they are already well integrated.

It is to be noted that Malaysians in Sabah as represented by their leaders and political parties, have proven their ability to govern Sabah themselves for the past 23 years since the formation of Malaysia, without the presence of any Peninsular party or parties.

There is no need for UMNO, PAS, DAP or any other Peninsular parties to come to Sabah. It would be redundant. The important thing is for Kuala Lumpur to be able to foster and work with the ruling group in Sabah and Sarawak.

Source: https://dusunbukit.wordpress.com/2013/12/05/the-20-points-basis-for-federal-state-relations-for-sabah/

On 27 May, 1961, Y.T.M Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, the Prime Minister, Federation of Malaya, at a press luncheon in Singapore made the proposal that a Federation of Malaysia should be created, comprising the eleven States of Malaya, Singapore, the three Borneo territories of Sarawak, North Borneo and Brunei. The regularly quoted words of the Tunku were as follows:

“… Sooner or later she (Malaya) should have an understanding with the peoples of Singapore, North Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak… these territories can be brought closer together in a political and economic cooperation” (speech made by Tunku Abdul Rahman on 27 May, 1961 to the Foreign Correspondents of Southeast Asia in Singapore).

Later, on 16 October, 1961, the Tunku explained to the Malayan Parliament the motivation and framework for the formation of the Federation of Malaysia as follows.

“… I will turn now to the problem of the Borneo territories in relation to the concept of Malaysia. These territories do not present the same complexity in the implementation of the concept as Singapore does. In a broad sense, it could be stated that the question is much simpler there, in fact so much simpler that they present a special difficulty of their own. The three Borneo territories have two political factors in common. First… vestiges for British colonialism. Second… their constitutional development has been very slow” (speech by Tunku Abdul Rahman, Prime Minister, the Federation of Malaya, in the Federal Parliament on 16 October, 1961).

Amidst all the rhetoric which accompanied the campaign for an enlarged Federation, the plan to include the States of North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei was, however, somewhat coincidental, for what the Tunku really wanted was Singapore. Nevertheless, the Tunku had one genuine aim for the Borneo territories – independence from the British colonialism. As he put it then:

On the British Government’s side, it was not an issue to grant independence to the Borneo States (North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei), since the British Government had decided to allow these territories to attain their own independence ultimately. The question was one of timing and the form it should take. As one document puts it:

“… Malaysia offers for them all the prospect of sharing in the destiny of what the British Government believes will be a great, prosperous and stable Independent State within the Commonwealth” (Extract from “North Borneo and Malaysia” published by Authority of the Government of North Borneo, Jesselton, February 1962)

Even at the point in time, there was considerable concern that the notion of ‘independence through Malaysia’ might not be the sort of independence that the Borneo States were looking for. There were those who were concerned about neo-colonialism. On this issue the Tunku had the following to say:

“… One reaction in the Borneo territories was that the Malaysia concept was an attempt to colonise the Borneo territories. The answer to this was, as I said before, it is legally impossible for the Federation to colonise because we desire that they should join us in the Federation in equal partnership, enjoying the same status between one another, so there is no fear that Malaysia will mean that there will be an imposition of Islam on Borneo… everybody is free to practise whatever religion.” (Extract of speech by Tunku Abdul Rahman, Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya, in the Federal Parliament on 16 October 1961)

In addition, the colonial government of North Borneo had cautioned that:

“… It is necessary, therefore, for the people of North Borneo to consider what powers they are prepared to concede in order to bring Malaysia into being. It is understood that there should be widespread apprehension lest, in practice, Malaysia would mean that the people of North Borneo would have far less control over their own affairs than they exercise already, and that North Borneo would be relegated to the position of a relatively powerless province of a strong Federal Government situated 1,000 miles away” (Extract from ‘North Borneo and Malaysia’)

For this reason, in the same speech the Tunku raised the issue of constitutional safeguards:

“… Moreover in our future constitutional arrangement the Borneo people can have a big say in matters on which they feel very strongly, matters such as immigration, customs, Borneonisation, and control of their State franchise rights.” (Speech by Tunku Abdul Rahman in the Federal Parliament on 16 October 1961)

The need for consultation and non-interference in the normal affairs of the Borneo State was highlighted by the Tunku.

Other observers noted that:

“… In conversation with members of the North Borneo delegation to the Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee he (the Tunku) has made it abundantly clear that he has no wish to interfere in the internal affairs of North Borneo and is willing to consider sympathetically any proposal for the management by the people of this country of their own internal affairs.” (IGC Report)

Even the Colonial Government of North Borneo cautioned strongly that:

“… It would, indeed, be against the long-term interest of the Malayan Government to insist on excessive control against the wishes of the people of the Borneo territories, which would over the course of the years build up resentment and discontent leading to a repetition within Malaysia of the internal stresses and strains which, in recent years, have become apparent within the framework of Indonesia, and, more recently still, have culminated in the secession of Syria from the United Arab Republic." (‘North Borneo and Malaysia’)

Arising from the various public statements on the need for safeguards and conditions, formal steps were undertaken to identify these safeguards and to present them for discussion by political leaders and officials of all the parties involves. A strong starting point for these discussions was the submission of a Memorandum containing the ‘Twenty Points’ on 29th August, 1962 by the leaders of five newly formed political parties (The United Kadazan Organisation, The United Sabah National Organisation, The United Party, The Democratic Party and The National Pasok Momogun organisation). The Memorandum was a joint declaration setting out the basis on which Malaysia would be acceptable in North Borneo and embodying minimal safeguards in the form of Twenty Points which the parties considered necessary for North Borneo in its entry into Malaysia. The signatories to the 20 Points Memorandum were as follows:

The principles of the 20 Points were accepted in total. The implementation of the Twenty Points was discussed at length by the IGC and most of them were subsequently taken up and incorporated in the Malaysia Agreement.

Discussion of the details of the various safeguards and conditions is the subject of the next section of this Memo. Suffice it to emphasize here that security consideration and economic development were important motivations for support for the proposed Federation, which was identified with independence in the mind of the People. Certainly, there existed as expectation that the new Federation will be conducive to harmony among ethnic groups and economic advancement in the rural areas.

The process of bringing the Malaysia Project to fruition was of course a lengthy and arduous task. It involved, among others, the Cobbold Commission of Inquiry, IGC and UN Malaysia Mission. While these bodies all came to the conclusion that the leaders and people of Sabah generally “expressed strong support for the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia” it is crucial to note that their views were by no means unanimous. The main finding of the Commission of Inquiry deserves to be mentioned here:

"There will remain a hard core, vocal and politically active, which will oppose Malaysia on any terms unless it is preceded by independence and self-government; the hard core might amount to near 20 per cent of the population of Sarawak and somewhat less in North Borneo.” (Extract of the Commission of Inquiry, North Borneo and Sarawak, 1962 – HMSO SMND, 1974).

The reservation exhibited by the people of Sabah (about two-thirds) as regards the proposed Federation served to emphasise the importance they attached to the provision of specific safeguards and conditions because of the uncertainty of their future in the enlarged Federation. The issue of safeguards and their fulfilment by the Federal government was very basic to their decision to form the Federation. Any violation of the safeguards would constitute a violation of the conditions upon which the State agreed to be a party to the formation of the Federation of Malaysia.

In retrospect, the vision of the Tunku, the aspirations of the Sabahan leaders and the consent of the Colonial Government as regards the formation of the Federation of Malaysia all converged on the important conclusion that:

(a)   Sabah would participate in the formation of the Federation in equal partnership with Malaya, Singapore and Sarawak;

(b)   The Federal government would not interfere in the internal affairs of Sabah, which would also be consulted on the future of her people and the future of Malaysia;

(c)   There would be autonomy in specific areas of government;

(d)   The new Federation promised an independence state and an improved economic well-being to the people of Sabah.

Source: https://dusunbukit.wordpress.com/2013/12/05/the-20-points-basis-for-federal-state-relations-for-sabah/

With all the political fiasco and moral policing that has been happening in the west (Malaya) recently, one of the most common comments from my fellow Sarawakians is how these things will never be an issue in Sarawak or even how good would Sarawak be if we were never part of Malaysia.

There is truth to that statement and I for one has been vocal about how our state has not gotten our fair share from the Malaysian Agreement that our forefathers in their own foresight signed to put our state in the trajectory of development. However, instead we have been short-changed, used, and milked dry of our resources to further expand the interest of our cousins in the west.

This dissatisfaction birthed the whole state nationalist sentiments ‘Sarawak for Sarawakians’ to in a sense instill regionalist pride among ourselves and the conviction to demand autonomy to run our state the ‘Sarawak Way’. I for one understand why this sentiments is gathering momentum and popularity because when I first heard of it, I also echoed their sentiments.

State nationalism is a good thing, pride for our own state is essential, and knowing where we come from is vital. But after thinking deeper, I do wonder, have these sentiments been wisely used in our current Malaysian political scenario?

Sentiments controls the interest of people, and sentiments divide. It is the same tactics Umno and even PAS are playing with the racial/religious cards to divide people and somewhat bend them to their will. I am not suggesting that ‘S4S’ is a bad sentiment, but just try dissecting its long-term effects as well as timing of the movement.

Recently, the ‘S4S’ movement have even demanded that we kick out all west political parties including the major three; DAP, PKR and PAS (which is actually non-existent). Who has all to gain from this move? Basically they are wiping out the opposition. Adenan Satem is a smart man. Why do you think he is probably the biggest supporter and face of this movement?

May I suggest that it is not the origin of the political party that should matter, but the ‘cause’ it is fighting for is what our focus should be upon. Fact is, a lot of Sarawakian local political parties have not taken care of the welfare of our very own people but rather playing their political games to gain power and to get a cut of the pie of our state’s rich resources.

Just see the games SUPP and UPP have been playing these past few months and when their leaders tried justifying it by saying it’s to serve the interest of the people, I kinda puked in my own mouth. Then the question for us to ponder is do we trust these local parties to spend the same amount of zeal fighting for their own benefit fighting for the state and our very own interest?

My issue with this is that the sentiments might in the right place, but for me its long-term effect might be devastating. Let’s face it, Sarawak will not achieve secession in the near future like many hope to achieve. So our actions or vote will still determine the future of Malaysia as a whole, and the political atmosphere of the west will still affect us.

Don’t let these sentiments cloud us

Through these sentiments, BN component parties will have everything to gain, and the opposition has everything to lose. Do not let these sentiments cloud us for other essential issues in our nation and strengthen a proven corrupt regime who has already messed up the country.

I personally do not think it is a coincidence these sentiments are gaining momentum so close to the state elections. It could be a political play, it may not be as well, but let us be careful that state pride will not be hijacked as a political ploy to stay in power.

Adenan Satem in now saying all the right things. I would like to emphasise that it is up to us to keep check that he walks the talk even after the elections. My hope is that down the line, the legacy of our local political parties will not just be to pride ourselves in keeping out western parties (Umno, etc), but actually building our state and allocating its riches responsibly to its people.

I for one am a firm believer of the future of my own state. I am in fact for the sentiments of state pride, but not for these sentiments to be hijacked to strengthen a corrupt regime. May I suggest again, that instead of pushing for ‘Sarawak for Sarawakians’, I personally prefer if we all push for ‘Sarawakians for Sarawak’.

This ideology instead challenges us Sarawakians to give back to our state whether in politics, economics, education and every other major spheres of influence. Sarawakians, in political parties no matter where its origin, claiming autonomy to run things in our own state which we know the best.

Sarawakians, who will continue to push for autonomy and betterment in education to educate our young, Sarawakians who will do our best in whatever work that is given to us and not take shortcuts, and most importantly Sarawakians who will not exploit the riches of our land for the interest of self.

Instead of just saying “all these will never happen in Sarawak”, show them and exemplify how it should be done that others will ask “what would Sarawakians do?” in moments of crisis.

As we celebrate Sarawak’s independence, let us make sure we will not be chained by any sentiments that will hinder us from the bigger picture. Short-sightedness has caused our state enough damage already.

Dum Spiro Spero - ‘While I breathe, I hope.’

Agi idup agi ngelaban! Happy 52nd Sarawak Independence Day!

Source: http://m.malaysiakini.com/letters/305822

As already stated, the Twenty Points Memorandum came into being when five political parties representing the people of Sabah presented a united stand on the minimum safeguards considered by the Sabahan leaders as crucial, the acceptance of which would pave the way for the formation of the new Federation. This document is truly important because it embodies the needs and aspirations of the people of Sabah.

The views expressed in the Twenty Points were the basis of Sabah’s acceptance to be part of the Federation of Malaysia. Most of the Twenty Points were incorporated upon deliberation, into the Inter-Governmental Committee Report and the Malaysia Agreement.

It should be stressed here that while much energies and time were expended in deliberations on the constitutional safeguards, the mechanism for their implementation and protection from change, amendment or deviation was conveniently disregarded. Hence, with a powerful and all-embracing Malayan Government, insufficient attention was paid by the Sabah negotiating team as to how the assurances, undertaking and promises could be implemented once Sabah became a component of the Federation of Malaysia. Little attention was also paid to the subject of recourse which Sabah might take against the Federal government in the event of breach of the constitutional safeguards and assurances. The safeguards were negotiated in the spirit of a gentlemen’s agreement. It can be inferred that the absence of any provision in the 20 Points for a possible recourse which Sabah could take against the Federal government in the event of a breach of the constitutional safeguards and conditions was indicative more of the faith of Sabah’s leaders in former Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman and the Federal government’s assurances rather than the lack of foresight. To them a gentlemen’s agreement was sufficient guarantee, although later events have proven Sabah’s leaders wrong.

The Twenty Points are presented below together with a statement of their status in the context of the IGC, Malaysia Agreement and Federal Constitution. Comments pertaining to deviations in implementation, where appropriate, are outlined after the presentation of each point.

While there was no objection to Islam being the national religion of Malaysia there should be no State religion in North Borneo, and the provision relating to Islam in the present Constitution of Malaya should not apply in North Borneo.

(a)   Malay should be the national language of the Federation;

(b)   English should continue to be used for a period of time of ten years after Malaysia Day;

(c)   English should be the official language of North Borneo, for all purposes, State or Federal, without limitation of time.

Whilst accepting that the present Constitution of the Federation of Malaya should form the basis of the Constitution of Malaysia, the Constitution of Malaysia should be a completely new document drafted and agreed in the light of free association of States and should not be a series of amendments to a Constitution drafted and agreed by different States in totally different circumstances. A new Constitution for North Borneo was, of course, essential.

The Head of State in North Borneo should not be eligible for election as Head of the Federation.

“Malaysia” but not “Melayu Raya”

Control over immigration into any part of Malaysia from outside should rest with the Federal government but entry into North Borneo should also require the approval of the State government. The Federal government should not be able to veto the entry of persons into North Borneo for State government purposes except on strictly security grounds. North Borneo should have unfettered control over the movement of persons, other than those in Federal government employ, from other parts of Malaysia into North Borneo.

There should be no right to secede from the Federation.

Borneonisation (Sabahanisation) of the public services should proceed as quickly as possible.

Every effort should be made to encourage British Officers to remain in the public services until their places can be taken by suitably qualified people from North Borneo.

The recommendations in paragraph 148(k) of the Report of the Cobbold Commission should govern the citizenship rights of persons in the Federation of North Borneo subject to the following amendments:

(a)   Subparagraph (I) should not contain the provision as to five years residence;

(b)   In order to tie up with our law, subparagraph (II)(a) should read “seven out of ten years” instead of “eight out of twelve years”;

(c)   Subparagraph (III) should not contain any restriction tied to the citizenship of parents – a person born in North Borneo after Malaysia must be a Federal Citizen.

North Borneo should have control of its own finance, development funds and tariffs.

In principle, the indigenous races of North Borneo should enjoy special rights analogous to those enjoyed by Malay in Malaya, but the present Malaya formula in this regard is not necessarily applicable in North Borneo.

(a)   The Chief Minister should be elected by unofficial members of Legislative Council;

(b)   There should be a proper Ministerial system in North Borneo.

This should be seven years and during such period legislative power must be left with the state of North Borneo by the Constitution and not merely delegated to the State government by the Federal government.

The existing educational system of North Borneo should be maintained and for this reason it should be under State Control.

No amendment, modification or withdrawal of any special safeguard granted to North Borneo should be made by the Central government without the positive concurrence of the government of the State of North Borneo. The power of amending the Constitution of the State of North Borneo should belong exclusively to the people in the State.

This should take account not only of the population of North Borneo but also of its size and potentialities and in any case should not be less than that of Singapore.

Yang DiPertua Negara

Sabah

The provision in the Constitution of the Federation in respect of the power of the National Land Council should not apply in North Borneo. Likewise the National Council for Local Government should not apply in North Borneo.

In conclusion, it is shown that there are a number of critical areas in which the Federal government has deviated from the original spirit and meaning of the constitutional safeguards and assurances granted to Sabah at the formation of Malaysia. The basic conditions were contained in the memorandum called the “Twenty Points”, the contents of which were subsequently incorporated into the IGC Report, the Malaysia Agreement and Federal Constitution. The principle areas in which there have been clear deviations with respect to implementation are those which relate to matters pertaining to Immigration, Religious freedom, Borneonisation, Citizenship, Education, Finance, and Tariff Arrangements and Constitutional safeguards.

Deviations in implementation with respect to these matters have been largely responsible for strained Federal-State relations, thereby presenting barriers for territorial integration. It must nevertheless be stressed that problems pertaining to Federal-State relations do not originate merely from deviations as described above. Equally important is the problem of political interference by Kuala Lumpur in State affairs.

As a result of the deviations and political interferences, an idea is now slowly taking root that there is going to be a ‘take-over’ of the Borneo Territories by Malaya and the submersion of the individualities of Sabah and Sarawak.

Source: http://uvsb.blogspot.com/2014/08/the-20-points-basis-for-federal-state.html

Sarawakians from all walks from life just celebrated their July 22 Independence Day for only the second time since 1963. It will be the turn of the peninsula and Sabah on August 31. This will be followed by Malaysia Day on September 16.

In previous years, the emphasis was only on August 31, while September 16 has only been observed for the last two years, 50 years after Sabah and Sarawak came together with Malaya in 1963 in a federation.

Before 2013, the police in Sabah and Sarawak would arrest anyone who observed September 16 and shoo away speakers at any public gathering on the occasion.

The Sarawak Government was forced to acknowledge July 22, over the hostility of Putrajaya, after activists demanded that it state in no uncertain terms when their homeland became independent from British rule. They warned that they would not accept the official line in school text books that “Sabah and Sarawak achieved independence through Malaysia on August 31.”

Not surprisingly, the perception in Borneo is that the new generation of leaders in Putrajaya knows little about 1963.

The Inspector General of Police, Khalid Abu Bakar, for one, demanded to know on the eve of July 22 whether the Sarawak4Sarawakians (S4S) movement was working towards the secession of the state from the federation. He warned that the Sedition Act would be invoked against S4S activists. In response, S4S revised its slogan to the even more controversial “We are Sarawakians” for next year’s celebration of July 22.

In the streets of Kuala Lumpur, the perception of the man in the street is that Sabah and Sarawak are unhappy with Malaysia and can’t understand “why are these people, so far away, with us, when they can be on their own?”

Such views are particularly voiced among non-Malays, who tend to be more outspoken on the relationship across the South China Sea. Malays tend to hold their peace on the issue as they cannot fathom how it concerns them immediately or affects them. They can’t afford the luxury of going beyond immediate bread-and-butter issues, but these are also the main pre-occupation of the others in the peninsula, including the media.

The press in the peninsula takes notice of Sabah and Sarawak only when matters involving the two states’ relationship with the Federal Government are raised and turn acrimonious. Otherwise, it is not interested in covering Sabah and Sarawak. Kinabalu and Lahad Datu were seen as international issues.

Companies in the peninsula, and certain politicians, see Sabah and Sarawak only in terms of their bottom line.

In Sarawak, more so than in Sabah, not a day has passed since 1963 without the people waking up and asking themselves the question: “How did we get into this situation? Why are we with Malaya on the other side of this big sea? They are so far away, even further than the moon. At least the moon is something that we can see every night. Why can’t we be on our own?”

The way forward for Sarawak, in the view of some people, including Adenan Satem, is full autonomy.

As has been stated by Prime Minister Najib Abdul Razak, the Federal Government agrees in principle that Sabah and Sarawak should have more powers. Najib sees this as handing over the responsibility for federal departments in Sabah and Sarawak to locals and/or the Sabah and Sarawak governments. As a rule of thumb, he believes that “what they can do, let them do.”

He draws the line when it comes to the oil and gas resources of Sabah and Sarawak. For the people in Borneo, this issue is non-negotiable. Either Petronas has to play ball or leave the region.

The issue is simple: the people in Sabah and Sarawak want Putrajaya to get out of the way. They want to be masters of their destiny. They can no longer accept having the Federal Government tell them what to do or what not to do in their homelands.

Patently, there’s a need to focus on the relationship between Sabah and Sarawak with the peninsula generally and with the Federal Government particularly.

All politics must be about the restructuring of political power and the restructuring of resources. Sabah and Sarawak must have power over themselves and control over their resources.

The only way that the Federal Government can get the people of Sabah and Sarawak immediately on its side is to help them deal with the local elite, who are seen at the moment as simply squatting on them. Given this situation, it’s not defensible, no longer tenable or sustainable in going forward for the local elite to be seen as proxies, stooges and rogue elements of the Federal Government and working against the interests of the people.

Source: http://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/opinion/2015/07/27/how-to-deal-with-sarawak-and-sabah/